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Introduction
My objective today is 10put forth a call for
each of you to rethink how we do applied policy
analysis, I plan to justify the need for this
rethinking using a variety of arguments. Some of
my arguments will be familiar to most if not all of
you, others may be unfamiliar to most if not all. I
claim no originality for the basic theoretical
arguments, they all appear in the literature. What I
hope you find to bc original and useful is the
synthesis of these arguments, Furthermore, though
in places I will point out the need for additional
theoretical work, my primaly goal is to convince
practicing agricultural po]Lcy analysts to beCO1nC
more comprchcnsivc in their analyses. In the grand
tradition of prcsldcnhal addresses, my remarks
cover a rather broad range of issues at the expense
of depth on any one issue. Ncvwtheless, 1 hope
that my remarks will stimulate discussion and
thought about how we as agricultural economists do
applied policy analysis.
Let me begin by prowding a quick
overview of my remarks. As previously stated, the
purpose is to address what I believe to bc major
limitations in the way that wc as agricultural
economists perform applied pollcy analysis.
Specific issues to be addressed include: (I) the
limits of static efficiency arguments and the need to
systematically address equ]ty issues, (2) our failure
to recognize the pervasiveness and import of rent
- ,Josept)Schumpe(er, (1947, pg xi)
seeking behavior, (3) a lack of attention to the
potentially dominate role of dynamic Considcrdtions,
and (4) the limitations of neoclassical theory for
analyzing uncertain, dynamic systems.
Inadequacies of Static Efficiency
Sbtic cllicicncy IS uuddcquate as the sole
policy analysis tool for at least three reasons. First,
there arc a number of important limitations or
caveats associated with any finding of efficiency
that often arc unrecognized or go unacknowledged.
Second, public policy IS generally concerned
primarily with cqrxty rather than efficiency
considerations. Third, static efficiency is an
cquihbrium condition and thus a very limited
measure of efficiency.
Linlilatiom 0/ Pareto Opllnml Sohtiom
Let me turn first to the limitations of static
efficiency analyses. First, as we arc all well aware
from our wclh-c theo]y training, Pareto optimal
solutions are not unique. They clearly depend on
the initial endowments and property rights as can be
dcmonstmtcd using an Edgeworth Box analysis in
exchange societies or by using production possibility
frontier and Scitovsky indifference curves in a
production economy’. Furthermore, as a result of
the dependence of Pareto optimal solutions upon the
original endowments and specification of property
rights, efficiency and equity are nonseparable,
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Recognizing this dependency, Just, Hueth and
Schmitz (1982, pg. 29) observe, “One cannot solve
the problem of efficiency and distribution in two
stages, by first maximizing the value of social
product by correctly allocating resources and then
distributing the product equitably.”
Despite these well known limitations,
common prmtice is to take the existing distribution
of resources and property rights as given, and then
analyze “gains” or “losses” in efllciency from that
point. This practice contributes to the tyranny of
the status quo which arises from four key factors,
First, by implicitly accepting the status quo
distribution as optimal, we treat efficiency as an
“objective truth value” (Bromley, 1990). Bromley
defines objective truth value as “an accepted
behavioral norm that allows the economist to offer
up an efficient outcome as both evidence of a
‘good’ thing and - more importantly as proof of the
scient!jic obJ”ectivit,y of that particular finding of
goodness” (pg. 87, original emphasis). Economists
that rely solely on a finding of efficiency, are in
effect hiding behind a bogus sense of objectivity,
Use of the Pareto criterion also clearly
favors the status quo distribution. As Just, Hueth
and Schmitz (1982, pg. 31) observe, “From a policy
point of view, the Pareto criterion Favors the status
quo since the range of choices that represent Pareto
improvements depends critically on the initial
distribution of income”, In effect, a large number
of alternative outcomes lying on higher Scitovsky
indifference curves are ruled ineligible under the
Pareto criterion.
The status quo also affects the framing of
problems in terms of “losses” and “gains”,
“Because the value function is steeper for losses
than for gains, a difference between options will
loom larger when it is framed as a disadvantage of
one option rather than as an advantage of the
competing option. ” (Tversky and Kahneman, pg.
456). Thus, from a marketing standpoint a cash
discount is more palatable than a credit surcharge,
Similarly, if beneficiaries of the status quo are able
to frame potential impacts as “losses”, these will be
valued more heavily than an equivalent amount of
“benefits” to be received by beneficiaries of the
proposed policy. Thus, for example, the “costs” of
environmental regulation loom larger than the
foregone “benefits” of cleaner water.
Finally, the existence of uncertainty,
provides a mechanism through which those favored
by the status quo can delay changes (Bromley,
1994), ~ommonly, the fi.dlcosts and benefits of a
proposed policy will be uncertain. Those fhvored
by the status quo will often call for more study, at
taxpayer expense, to ostensibly reduce the
uncertainty. The burden of proof and thus the
transactions costs fall on those currently bearing
unwanted costs,
Recent actions related to efforts in South
Florida to restore the Everglades provide an
example of how the existence of uncertainty can be
used as a delaying tactic. The original
environmental legislation, known as the settlement
agreement or the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Act
was scheduled to take effect in January 1992 and
mandated that specified water quality standards be
achieved by July 2002. This Act, required
agricultural industries to implement specified BMPs
and implemented a per acre tax to fund offsite clean
up activities. Agricultural interests filed 36 separate
lawsuits, challenges and appeals to the settlement
agreement, New legislation, known as the
“Everglades Forever Act” was passed in 1994 in
response to the various lawsuits and challenges.
The new legislation requires that the industry
implement BMPs and assesses an “agricultural
privilege tax” of approximately $25 per acre for a
period of 20 years, However, the industry was able
to delay the beginning date of the legislation by two
and one-half years, and the date that water quality
standards have to be met by four and one-half
years. The Everglades Forever Act also mandates
additional research be done at taxpayer expense.
Meanwhile, the regional water management agency
responsible for implementing the legislation, spent
over $6.5 million on litigation related expenses over
the period, October 1988- July 1993.
Equity as the Primary Policy Objective
The second major reason that static
efficiency analysis is inadequate as a policy tool is
that not only is efficiency not unique and
nonseparable from equity considerations, generally
efficiency isn’t the key policy issue. Public policyJ Agr and Apphed ECOII December, 1994 3
is about the incidence of impacts, redistribution of
wealth or economic opportunity is generally the
objective, not efficiency (Bromley, 1994). In fact,
government’s power arises from Its ability to
reassign resources by taxing or passing laws.
Despite this obvious government function, there
seems to be a great reluctance among economists to
consider equity issues. In noting this reluctance,
Castle (1993, pg. 279) observed, “1 have been
disturbed by the unwillingnessof many economists to
consider the philosophical underpinnings of our
discipline, The consequence has often been either
the rejection of economics or m rigid application.
Either apprcxdch results in too narrow a view of
policy making.” Clearly, in order to participate
effectively in policy debates, agricultural economists
need to become better equipped to deal with equity
issues. We can begin by becoming more famihar
with the various concepts of social Justice including
social welfare or utilitarian philosophy (e.g.
Bentham (1791), Samuelson (1947), Rawls (1971))
and Kantian philosophy of absolute rights (e.g.
Buchanan (1954) and Nozick (1974)), The recent
changes in Washington, D.C. may underscore the
policy importance of understanding alternative
philosophical positions and their implications,
The profession also needs to move more
aggressively to formally integmtc cqwty and
efficiency considerations into our policy analyses.
Chavas’ (1995) pioneering work provides a
beginning. His framework is based on Rawls’
concepts of fairness as lack of envy (as formulated
by Pazner in his fairness equivalence concept),
original position and the veil of ignorance. Chavas’
framework allows the analyst to explicitly analyze
equity - efficiency tradeoffs.
As policy analysts, we also need to be
more cognizant of the pervasiness of rents and rent
seeking behavior and the role they play in policy
making. As Mueller (1989, pg. 238) observed,
“Few issues illicit greater agreement among
economists than the proposition that society‘s
welfare is maximized by competitive markets and
free trade, yet tariffs, quotas, regulations abound;
one suspects that the allocative efficiency gains
from competition and free t~dde so obvious to the
economist have been sacrificed to provide the
equally obvious rents and redistributive gains that
restrictions engender.” 1’11return to this issue of
rents and rent seeking in a moment,
Static E(jlclency ax an Equilibrium Condition
Third, static efficiency is inadequate since
it is an equilibrium condition and thus a very
limited measure of total efficiency. Social, as well
as environmental and natural resource systems arc
characterized by change. Castle (1993, pg. 280)
argues that one of the fundamental conditions for
successfully managing natural resource systems
currently missing in the literature is “the need to
recognize that the natural environment and social
systems are in constant change.” Capitalism in
particular is defined by change as Schumpeter
observed, “Capitalism then is by nature a form or
method of economic change and not only never is
but never can be stationary.” (1947, pg. 82), Before
pursuing this issue of dynamics, let me first return
to the importance of rents and rent seeking.
Rent Seeking
Rent seeking is a relatively recent addition
to economic theory dating from Tullock’s seminal
work in 1967, followed closely with works by
Stigler (1971), Krueger (1974), Buchanan (1980)
and others. This theory has not fully penetrated
applied agncultuml and resource policy analysis.
There arc a number of key chdmcteristics
of rents and rent seeking that are important to keep
in mind m the context of applied policy analysis.
First rents can arise as a result of government policy
or from private activities (e.g. access to Ricardian
inputs, technological change). Second, as Tullock
(1967) pointed out, we need to clearly differentiate
between good rents and bad rent seeking, Rents can
be good in that they play a crucial role in
stimulating innovation. Rent seeking behavior on
the other hand, leads directly to socially wasteful
expenditures, as “people jockey at the trough”.
(Rauch calls this the “parmite economy ”,) Third,
politicians can extract rents by creating Stiglerian
rents or by extorting existing private or previously
generated public rents (McChesney, 1988). Fourth,
it is important to remember the iron rule of rent
seeking, “Wherever a rent is to be found, a rent
seeker will be there trying to get it.” The kcy
lesson for our purposes, is that the rent seeking
literature has demonstrated that nearly all forms of
government activity have the potential to create or
redistribute wealth and thus are likely to stimulate
rent seeking behavior, including economic incentwc4 Boggess The Poverty oj Apphed Policy Analysis
mechanisms which textbooks commonly treat as
pure transfers (Lee, 1988),
Ren~ Seeking in the Everglades Controversy
Evidence of rent seeking is widespread in
the debate over how best to restore the Everglades
ecosystem in South Florida. On onc hand, are the
agricultural interests who clearly have incentives to
protect existing rents arising from government
import restrictions. Estimates vary, but values in
excess of $200 million per year ($450 per acre)
have been common in recent years. A March 1993,
Floi-lda Trend article (Hagy) reported that the
indust~ had spent an estimated $15 million on legal
fees, contributed millions more to political
campaigns, spent $100,000s on public relations, and
had 30 lobbyists in Tallahassee representing the
industry’s interests during deliberations on the
Everglades Forever Act.
On the other hand, some environmentalists
have viewed Everglades restoration as an
opportunity to secure environmental benefits at
industry or other’s expense, Thus environmental
groups lobbied for much higher taxes on agriculture
than the approximately $25 per acre figure that was
included in the Everglades Forever Act. The $25
figure is based on a relatively narrow application of
the polluter pays principle. Environmental interests
also proposed a ballot measure that would have
implemented a penny a pound tax on sugar
production with the proceeds used for environmental
restoration, (In a routine review, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that the proposed amendment
violated established restrictions on content and
struck it from the ballot.)
A recent environmental proposal seeks to
utilize existing industry rents in an innovative
manner. Under this proposal, environmentally
sensitive lands currently in sugar production would
be purchased from growers at market price.
Simultaneously an agreement would be forged with
the Federal government to allow the state to import
at the world price, an amount of sugar equivalent to
the normal production from the purchased acreage,
The imported sugar could then be sold at the U.S.
domestic price and the difference used to pay off
the mortgage on the land purchase,
In the middle of the two main competing
interests, is the South Florida Water Management
District who is primarily responsible for managing
water in South Florida. Over the past decade the
District’s budget has tripled from $97.1 million in
1986to $293 million in 1995 and the staff increased
60% from 1037 to 1651 FTEs, This evidence
suggests that District might also be susceptible to
rent seeking behavior,
Implications ,jix”Policy Analysis
The pervasiness of rent seeking behdvior
has important implications for policy analysts. As
a start we need to be more cognizant of the
importance of rents and rent seeking. Second, as
policy analysts, one of our tasks is to design
institutions that allow and encourage those forms of
competition that create rents by creating additional
consumer surpluses and discourage competition
designed to gain and retain existing rents, Third,
we need to avoid what I call the “naive analyst
risk”, where economic efficiency arguments are
embraced or worse yet manipulated as a weapon to
support particular rent seeking positions,
Naive analyst risks can arise in a number
of contexts, First, as Sonstelie and Portney have
argued, calculating the costs in benefit-cost analyses
is much more difficult than many people
acknowledge. Cost estimates are often subject to
rent seeking manipulation by the impacted industry
since the industry has asymmetric access to
information as well w an incentive to bias cost
estimates. Second, consultants may be hired to
justi~ preestablished positions. This may happen
when the client is a private entity, as well as when
the client is a government entity. Smith (1994),
13romley(1994) and others have recently waged a
lively debate on this and related issues. Suffice it
to say that at times we’re part of the rent seeking
problem - sometimes naively - other times, and
more disturbingly, deliberately, Finally, colleges of
agriculture are susceptible to rent seeking which
leads both to sms of commission (i.e. doing research
to support established industry positions) as well as
sins of omrssion (i.e. not doing “controversial’
research).J Agr and Applied Eco)t , December, 1994 5
Dynamic Considerations
Let me now turn to my third major topic,
the potentially dominate role of dynamic
considerations, My intent here is not to argue that
dynamic efficiency as opposed to static efficiency 1s
socially optimal. Dynamically efficient solutions
are equally as dependent upon the prevailing
property rights and endowments as are static
efficient solutions, Furthermore, dynamic efficiency
considerations raise additional concerns about the
appropriate rate of discount and how to reflect
preferences of future generations. My intent is
merely to argue that dynamic adjustments to
policies may well offset the estimated static impacts
and that these dynamic considerations deserve more
careful consideration by policy analysts.
The difference between a static and a
dynamic analysis is in some ways equivalent to the
difference between a zero-sum and a positive sum
game. In a static, zero-sum world, regulation is
perceived to inevitably lead to reduced
competitiveness. When competitiveness and the
environment is framed in this way, the tradeoff
ignites a distributional power struggle which can
consume enormous resources. As an example, a
1992 Rand study reported that 88’?/o of superfund
payments were spent on transactions costs, only
12!40was used to clean up contaminated sites,
It is also important to realize that in
general, static efficiency is not a necessary condition
for dynamic efficiency or as Schumpeter (1947, pg.
83) observed, “A system that at every given point in
time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best
advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a
system that does so at no given point in time,
because the latter’s failure to do so may be a
condition for the level and speed of long-run
performance, ”
Innovation 0j3ets
Michael Porter, the Harvard Business
School expert on competitiveness has focused
attention on the key role of innovation and dynamic
adjustments. He argues that the old comparative
advantage and economies of scale paradigms for
competitiveness have been largely superseded by
globalization and new information technologies.
The new paradigm of international competitiveness
is based on innovation,
In extending the competitiveness paradigm
to the consideration of the relationship between
environmental regulation and competitiveness,
Porter and van dcr Linde (1994) have focused
attention on the critical role of innovation offsets.
Innovation offsets reflect dynamic adjustments
induced by a regulation that ultimately result in
lower costs of compliance than static analyses
would suggest. Innovation offsets can arise from
the discovery of lower cost compliance procedures,
the development of better production processes or
products, and possibly the spinning off of new
environmental industries spawned in response to the
regulation.
Porter’s arguments have lead to what has
become known as the “Porter hypothesis”, that
increasingly stringent environmental regulation leads
to improved economic performance (i.e.
competitivcncss) rather than to the conventional
tradeoff implicit in static analyses. Based on my
reading of Porter and van der Linde, I’m not
convinced that Porter would accept this hypothesis
as a hard and fast rule. I believe that Porter and
van der Lmde are trying to make three key points.
First, that dynamic considerations may dominate
static concerns, Second, that producers are not
Panglossian dynamic optimizers, they sometimes
need to be induced, And third, that properly
formulated regulations can provide the necessary
incentives to generate innovation offsets.
Furthermore, [ believe that Porter would
argue that tests of the “hypothesis” are premature in
the U,S, since we haven’t designed environmental
policies or regulatory processes with dynamic
efficiency objectives in mind. Nevertheless, there
have been a number of studies examining the Porter
hypothesis, Porter and van der Linde provide
descriptions of a number of case examples to
illustrate the range and potential impact of
innovation offsets, There have also been a few
studies that have attempted to test the hypothesis
econometrically. However, difficulties arise in
measuring both regulatory stringency as well as
competitiveness. Lanjouw and Mody (1993) using
international data, found a positive relationship
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patenting of environmental technologies. Jaffc and
Palmer (1994), using U.S. panel data found mixed
results. They found a positive relationship between
enwronmcntal compliance expenditures and overall
research and development expenditures. f{owever,
there was no significant relationship between
cnwronmentd compliance expenditures and
successfid patent applications.
Desirable Properties @Environmen~al Regulations
Porter and van der Lindc (1994) developed
a set of eight properties for environmental
regulations and a set of three characteristics of
regulatory processes that would enhance the
potential for innovation offsets. Desirable properties
of environnmntal regulations include: (1) focus on
outcomes not technologies, (2) change products and
production processes, don’t treat wastes, (3) use
market incentives, (4) regutate as late as possible in
the value chain, (5) provide phase-in periods, (6)
lead international standards, but don’t get too far
ahead, (6) harmonize or converge associated
regulations, and (8) balance liability exposure.
Desirable characteristics of rebwlatory processes
include: (1) predictability and stability to minimize
option values (See Pagano, et al. 1995), (2) promote
industry - regulatory interaction to minirmze
“struggles”, but be careful to avoid capture, and (3)
improve regulatory efficiency by minimizing
overlaps and conflicting regulations and thus
reducing the transactions costs associated w]th
comphance and enforcement,
Implications for Policy Anal,v.ris
I think it is clear that environmental
regulation does not inevitably lead to enhanced
competitiveness. Equally clear however, is that
reduced renovations can offset static Impacts, and
that regulations should be designed to foster this
potential. In a sirmlar vein, economic impact
assessments typically overestimate compliance costs
because they Pad to systematically account for
induced renovation offsets.
be more prevalent than we might think. The key is
to focus on modifying the production process, not
residual treatment.
Expericncc with implementation of
environmental regulation of dairies near Lake
Okccchobec provides some evidence of the potential
impact of innovation offsets2. The purpose of the
regulations was to reduce phosphorus runoff into
Lake Okeechobee. The regulations have induced
dairies to reduce the phosphorus content of dairy
rations, install feed barns which not only facilitate
manure handling and recycling but also reduce cow
stress and feed waste, and design ncw rotational
grazing systems which minimize manure handling
and concentration. The regulations also stimulated
development of a privately marketed wastewater
treatment system that has been used for swine M
well as dairy opemtions. A study examining the
economic Impact of these innovation offsets is
currently underway. Prclimimdry econometric
evidcncc suggests that the physwal productivity
impacts have been significant. Since
lmplemcntatlon of the rcgulahons, average milk
production per cow in the affected area has been
increasing at 150 percent the rate of increase
observed in the rest of Florida.
Limitations of Neoclassical Theory
Finally, let mc offer a couple of
observations regarding the limitations of the
neoclassical theory of growth and innovation.
Neoclassical growth theory indicates that perfect
competition will direct an economy towards its
optimal constant growth path. Thus, static
efficiency which is implied by perfect competition
is a ncccssary condition for dynamic efficiency,
Rut clearly, economic growth is anything but
constant over time, Real business cycle models
were developed to help explain variations in
economic growth. However, these models rely on
random productivity shocks and convex preferences
to generate output fluctuations. Neither neoclassical
growth theory nor real business cycle models
provide any insights into the sources of or the
processes that generate innovation.
Recognizing that pollution is generally a Schumpcter was one of the first economists
residud byproduct of the production process to systematically recognize the essential dynamic
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971), suggests that the aspect of capitalism which he called the “process of
opportunities for generating innovation offsets may creative destruction” (1947, pg. 82), He describedJ Agr, and Applted Ikon,, December, 1994 7
this process as, “The fundamental impulse that sets
and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes
from the ncw consumers’ goods, the new methods
of production or transportation, the new markets, the
new forms of industrial organization that capitalist
enterprise creates,”
Schumpeter also recogrmed the crucial
need for rent appropriation as an }ncentive for
innovation - a condition inconsistent with textbook
perfect competition and growth theory. Once
innovation is considered cndogenous to the system,
rather than exogenous as in neoclassical theory,
static efficiency is no longer a necessary condition
for dynamic efficiency,
The ability to appropriate rents plays two
critical roles in the innovation process, First, it
provides an incentive for firms to invest in research
and development and second it prowdes fknds for
research and development, The sugar industry in
South Florida may be a case in point. As a result
of government import restrictions, this industry has
earned significant rents. Contrary to neoclassical
arguments regarding competitive pressure and x-
inefficiency, the industry has generated very high
rates of growth in productivity y. The increase in
productivity is due to the industry’s high rates of
investment in research and development which have
lead to new varieties, new harvcstmg techmques,
and new milling technologies, As a result, the
Florida industry is now considered by many
industry analysts to be the low cost producer of
sugarcane in the western hemisphere and cost of
production studies indicate that Florida’s cost is
below the world average (Landell Mills, 199I),
Only recently, with the development of
advanced game theory and mathematics, have
Schumpeter’s insights begun to get more formal
theoretical analysis by mainstream economists
(Thompson, 1993), However there is still a long
way to go before we have a satisfactory dynamic
theory.
Complex, Adaptive Systems Models
An alternative approach, that may have
potential to improve our understanding of dynamic
economic systems, is what is becoming known as
complex, adaptive systems models in the broader
scientific literature. Three fundamental insights
underlie these models. First, change is not
continuous and gradual, but punctuated or episodic.
This is in contrast to neoclassical growth theory and
the related Clementsian ecological view of
succession and climax, Second, spatial and
temporal attributes are not uniform, they are patchy
and bunchy. Third, systems do not have a single
equilibrium with functions controlled to remain near
it, Rather multiple equilibria exist and systems
move between them.
CS, Helling (1992), an ecologist, has
developed a four quadrant model bdsed on empirical
analyses of complex adaptive systems (Figure 1).
The four quadmnts (i.e. exploitation, conservation,
release and reorganization) represent the four stages
or phases of ecosystem dynamics. The two axes
measure the degree of storage/capital accumulation
and connectancc/stability in the system, Finally the
circular flow path and arrows illustrate the pattern
of movement between the stages. The frequency of
the arrows represents the relative speed of
movement. Thus, systems tend to spend relatively
long periods in the conservation stage and relatively
short times in the rcliase stage,
Briefly, the dynamics are as follows.
Starting in the exploitation stage (e.g. after a fire in
an ecosystem, or aficr a war, discovery of a new
frontier or technological change in a social system)
the system rapidly exploits the available resources
and growth is very rapid and opportunistic. Over
time opportunities to exploit available resources
become limited and the system moves into a
rclatively long conservation stage, This stage is
characterized by relative stability and predictability.
The combined exploitation and conservation phases
would correspond to the traditional Clementsian
ecological modq! of succession and climax as well
as the neoclassical growth model in economics.
I-Iowever,observations of both ecosystems
and social systems suggest that during this
conservation phase systems tend to accumulate
capital and becotne strongly connected. As
connectmce grows the system becomes brittle and
susceptible to disturbances that could previously be
absorbed, Thus, ecosystems find that the prevalence
of a single climax species makes the system more
susceptible to pest outbreaks and similarly the
buildup of biomass makes systems more susceptible
to fire (e.g. Yellowstone National Park). Similarly,8 Boggess The Pover~ of Applied Policy A nalysis
Figure 1, Iiolling’s Four Stage Model of Complex Adaptive Systems,
4 REORGANIZATION I I 2 CONSERVATION
1 EXPLOITATION II 3 RELEASE
wEAK ~CONNECTEDNESS ~STRONG
social systems tend to become more homogcnous
and bureaucratic and thus less flexlble and more
susceptible to disturbances. These disturbances can
be both internal (e.g. bureaucratic break-down) or
external (e.g. technological change),
A case in point for social systems may be
related to Mancur Olson’s observation that, “Stable
societies with unchanged boundaries tend to
accumulate more collusions and organizations for
collective action over time.” In other words,
interest groups come, but they rarely go, The resutt
being government calcification or demosclcrosis to
use Rauch’s term. Olson goes on to argue that
interest groups “usually survive untd there is a
social upheaval or other form of vlolencc or
instability”.
As systems succumb to disturbances, there
is a rapid release of capital resources and a break-
down in structure. The system then moves into a
reorganization phase characterized by relatively
large amounts of accessible resources and httle
connectance. The combination of release and
reorganization corresponds closely to Schumpcter’s
process of creative destruction which he argued
defined capltdism. The lack of structure in the
reorganization phase leads to a chaotic environment.
The current Washington political scene provides a
useful example. Chaos theory has provided some
initial insights into the dynamics of reorganization.
One of the key insights being that relatively small
well timed or even random events can have major
impacts on the future structure of the system.
Helling argues that systems cycle through
these stages, but the fundamental nature of the
system can change each time through, depending
upon the dynamics of the reorganization phase.
Thus, a conifer forest might burn and ultimately
recsrablish itself or be replaced by a hard wood
forest. The dynamics of social systems would
appear to be similar with one key difference. The
existence of purposeful behavior in social systems
enhances feedback effects that can compound the
connectance problem (e.g. fisheries exploitation,
secondary disease outbreaks, Everglades dminage),
as well as provide the potential for adaptive
management. Adaptive management requires
focusing on ecosystem rcsilcnce (sustainability)
rather than subsystem enhancement and stability
which eventually leads to rigidity and increased
susceptibility to disturbances.
In a related development, Common and
Perrings have attempted a merging of economic and
ecological concepts of sustainability to derive an
ecological economics concept of sustainability.
They use the Solow/Hartwick concept of
intertemporal price efficiency to reflect the
economic component and the Helling concept of
ccosystcm resilience to reflect the ecological
component. Holiing’s distinction between
ecosystem stability (rigidity) and ecosystem
resilience (sustainability) reflects the fundamental
physical feedbacks or dynamics that characterize
ecosystems, Common and Perrings show that the
Solow/Hartwlck and IIolling sus~dinabilityconcepts
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is not necessarily incompatible with ecological
sustainability of the system, but on the other hand,
it clearly is not a necessary condition. Their results
also suggest that the problem of ecological
sustainability has to be solved at the level of
preferences and technologies and thus these factors
need to be made endogenous in economic models of
sustainability, Furthermore, they argue that
ecological sustainability requires abandonment of
the principle of consumer sovereignty as the driving
economic force. Ecological economics of
sustainability implies an approach that explicitly
recognizes system dynamics and privileges the
requirements of the system above those of the
individual,
In a different context, Stanford economist,
W. Brian Arthur (1990) and colleagues (Anderson,
et al. 1988) at the Sante Fe Institute have pioneered
the application of complex adaptive systems to
economic systems that exhibit increasing returns w
opposed to the common neoclassical assumption of
decreasing returns. Charactenstlcs of increasing
returns systems include multiple equilibria and
extreme sensitivity to random events and event
timing. Arthur has used nonlinear random-process
theory to model increasing returns systems. Onc of
his key illustrative examples is the competition
between competing VHS and Beta VCR
technologies. His models illustrate how fortuitous
circumstances and early corporate maneuvering
allowed VHS to achieve an early market share
advantage that allowed it to capture virtually the
entire VCR market, despite expert claims that the
Beta technology was technically super[or. Arthur
uses mathematical simulations of this competition
and similar systems using nonlinear, random process
mathematics to illustrate how multiple solutions can
emerge from the same initial conditions and to
study the probabilities that a particular solution will
emerge under a certain set of initial conditions.
Though still in their infancy, efforts to
apply complex adaptive systems models to study
social systems show promise. The exploitation and
conservation phases have many parallels with
neoclassical growth theory. The creative destruction
(i.e. release) and renewal stages reflect the uncertain
dynamic components that are ill defined in
neoclassical theory, Formal recognition and
examination of these stages may allow for better
understanding of the processes of innovation and
change and a deeper understanding of sustainability.
Summary
In summary, let me leave you with the five
main points that I hope you will take away from
this address. First, as policy analysts we need to
explicitly recognize that efficiency is not an
objective truth value, As BrornIey (1990, pg.106)
put it, economists have been “hiding behind a bogus
and quite irrelevant facade that makes us feel good
and look bad”, [n this respect we need to begin by
explicitly recognizing the nonuniqueness and
nonseparability of efficiency analyses and work to
extend our analytical frameworks to jointly consider
efficiency and equity, Chavas has provided a
promising start in this direction,
Second, in policy circles, redistribution of
wealth or economic opporhmities is often the
objective, and rent seeking is endemic, Economists
who fail to recognize this are naive and subject to
either being ignored as irrelevant or worse yet
manipulated to support particular rent seeking
positions, In our analyses we need to more
carefully reflect the important role that rents play in
the innovation process M well as the real costs
associated with rent seeking behavior.
Third, dynamic adjustments often offset
static impacts. Furthermore, in general static
efficiency is not a necessary condition for dynamic
efficiency. Fourth, erivironmental regulation is not
necessarily a zero-sum game. But neither does it
inevitably lead to innovation and enhanced
competitiveness. Policies need to be designed to
foster innovation offsets and economic impact and
cost benefit analyses need to more carefully address
these issues.
Finally, neoclassical growth theory 1s
inadequate in its understanding of uncertainty and
the dynamics of innovation, growth, and
sustainability. Complex, adaptive systems theory
provides a promising alternative framework for
beginning to understand uncertain, dynamic systems.10 Boggess: Iite Pouer(y oj Applled Pollc,v Anul,vsls
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Endnotes
1. See Just, Hueth and Schmitz, Chapter 2 for detailed discussion.
2. See Boggess (1993) for a case study description of environmental regulation of dairies in the
Okeechobee area.